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The Concept of Non-Discrimination 
ALEXANDER H. E. MORAWA 
European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany 
 
“ Ovo ovum simile.”  
 
International law, such as Article 26 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides: 
 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.1 
 
‘Absence of discrimination’, on the one hand, and ‘equal protection of the law’, or the 
‘prohibition of discrimination’, on the other hand are distinct manifestations of the 
principle of equality. The former is mostly negative, the traditional ‘shall not …’-
approach in international human rights law. The latter terms describe the positive 
aspect of equality, requiring affirmative legislative, administrative and/or judicial 
action. 
 
¨  ¨  ¨ 
 
Let us first examine the negative elements of non-discrimination which in essence 
require states “not to discriminate in their laws.” 2 Depending on the status of the norm 
in the framework of a treaty and its language, ‘non-discrimination’ may be an 
accessory right –  that is, equality is safeguarded merely with respect to the other 
substantive rights enumerated in the treaty, such as Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights3 –  or an independent right to equality demanding 
                                                 
1 UN G.A. Resolution 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force 23 March 1976 (hereinafter 
‘CCPR’). 
2 Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary  (Kehl am Rhein, 
1993) 469, MN 19. 
3 Dated 4 November 1950, E. T.S. No. 5 (hereinafter ‘ECHR’). 
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material justice, like Article 26 of the Covenant4 and the new 12th Additional 
Protocol to the ECHR.5 
The right to equality before the law does not render all differences of treatment 
discriminatory.6 Indeed, at the core of the concept is a rule so fundamental that it is 
hardly ever mentioned: equal situations are to be treated equally and unequal 
situations differently.7  “A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria 
does not amount to prohibited discrimination.” 8  Or, as the European Court of Human 
Rights phrased it in its June 2002 judgment in Willis v. the United Kingdom:  “…  [A] 
difference of treatment is discriminatory if it ‘has no objective and reasonable 
justification’, that is, if it does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a 
‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims 
sought to be realised’.” 9 States will enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when 
adopting measures they deem necessary;10 however, that margin will be quite narrow 
or, in other words, states would have to advance “very weighty reasons” 11 for their 
measures to survive judicial scrutiny, when a differentiation is based solely on what 
may be called a ‘suspect criterion’, such as race or sex.12 
                                                 
4 Cf. Human Rights Committee (hereinafter: ‘HRC’), Communications Nos. 172/1984, S.W.M. Broeks 
v. the Netherlands, views of 9 April 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, paras. 12.1 et seq., and 182/1984, 
F. H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands, views of 9 April 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984, paras. 12.1 
et seq., emphasized also in General Comment No. 18/37 on Non-Discrimination, dated 9 November 
1989, para. 12.  See also Torkel Opsahl, “Equality in Human Rights Law, with Particular Reference to 
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” , in Manfred Nowak (ed.), 
Fortschritt im Bewuß tsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Felix Ermacora (Kehl am 
Rhein 1988), 51, 61. 
5 Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted 
on 4 November 2000, E.T.S No. 177, Article 1.  
6 For a thorough discussion of recent international practice in this field see: Alexander H.E. Morawa, 
“The Evolving Right to Equality” , 1 European Yearbook of Minority Issues  (2001/02), forthcoming. 
7 The drafters of Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR, however, mention it: Explanatory Report, para. 15.  
8 HRC, Broeks v. the Netherlands, at para. 13. 
9 Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. 36042/97, Willis v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 11 June 2002, para. 39, 
summarizing its constant jurisprudence. 
10 The ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine stems from the Court’s case-law relating to the restriction 
clauses contained, for instance, in Article 10 (2) of the Convention permitting states to restrict rights for 
certain enumerated reasons, but only as far as such limitations are “necessary in a democratic society.”   
Necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a “pressing social need”  and, in particular, that it 
is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  “The Contracting States have a certain margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European 
supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an 
independent court.  The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ 
is reconcilable with the rights protected by the Convention … ” .  Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. 29221,29225/95, 
Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria , judgment of 2 October 2001, at 
para. 87. 
11 Willis v. the United Kingdom, para. 39, with reference to Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 
21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, para. 39. 
12 The ‘suspect criteria’ are discussed in Morawa, “The Evolving Right to Equality” , chapter D. 
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Let us take a look at free speech.  ‘Equality’ may not be the first issue that comes 
to mind when considering the question of what ‘contents’ is protected by free speech 
clauses. But if one focuses on the speakers and the recipients, things are different: 
everyone enjoys the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority … ” .13 But does everyone enjoy that 
freedom to the same extent? 
True, everyone has the right to demonstrate against the policies of a foreign 
government during a state visit, for instance,14 or against the purchase of fighter 
planes by his or her own government.15 Everyone may distribute leaflets without first 
having to overcome excessive administrative burdens.16 And everyone faces limits 
which are spelled out in the very provisions safeguarding the right to free speech, such 
as “the rights and reputation of others.”  
Along comes a journalist, Mr Lingens.  He criticizes certain statements of a leading 
politician as “immoral, undignified” , adds that “had they been made by someone else 
this would probably have been described as the basest opportunism.” 17 He is sued by 
the politician and convicted by the courts for defamation.  Before the European Court 
of Human Rights he argues:  I am not everyone, I am a “political journalist.” 18 It is my 
duty in a pluralist society to criticize politicians. I must be permitted to go further in 
my criticism than the average citizen. The Court agrees: 
 
[F]reedom of expression …  constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual’s self-fulfilment. …  [I]t is applicable not only to ‘information’ or 
‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there 
is no ‘democratic society’.  These principles are of particular importance as far 
as the press is concerned.19 
 
The Court goes further: 
 
                                                 
13 Article 10 (1) ECHR. 
14 HRC, Communication No. 412/1990, Auli Kivenmaa v. Finland, views of 31 March 1994, 
CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990. 
15 Eur. Ct. H.R., Chorherr v. Austria, judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A, No. 266-B. 
16 HRC, Communication No. 780/1997, Vladimir Petrovich Laptsevich v. Belarus, views of 20 March 
2000, CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997. 
17 Eur. Ct. H.R., Lingens v. Austria, judgment of June 24, 1986, Series A, No. 103, paras. 12 and 15.  
18 Ibid., at para. 37. 
19 Ibid., para. 41 (emphasis added). 
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The limits of acceptable criticism are …  wider as regards a politician as such 
than as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and 
knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by 
both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a 
greater degree of tolerance.20 
 
In this there lie already two substantive distinctions: journalists enjoy a somewhat 
higher level of ‘freedom to criticize’ than ordinary people. Plus, on the receiving end, 
politicians must ‘tolerate’ more criticism than others. Mind that we still speak of the 
same right:  freedom of expression.  
Along comes another applicant who was sanctioned for writing a critical political 
article in a Spanish magazine, Mr Castells. He is also a senator and member of a 
political group supporting independence for the Basque Country. He has this to say 
about those who, in his opinion, wage war against the Basques: “Frankly, I do not 
believe that the fascist associations which I cited earlier have any independent 
existence, outside the State apparatus. In other words I do not believe that they 
actually exist. Despite all these different badges, it is always the same people. Behind 
these acts there can only be the Government, the party of the Government and their 
personnel.” 21 
A journalist and politician. A man who criticizes not merely a politician, but the 
entire government. What level of protection does that situation trigger? The Court’s 
solution is this: 
 
While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is especially so for 
an elected representative of the people. He represents his electorate, draws 
attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. Accordingly, 
interferences with the freedom of expression of an opposition member of 
parliament, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the 
Court.22 
 
And the court adds: 
 
The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government 
than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.23 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid., para. 42 (emphasis added). 
21 Eur. Ct. H.R., Castells v. Spain, judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A, No. 236, para. 7.  
22 Ibid., para. 42 (emphasis added). 
23 Ibid., para. 46 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, politicians may be seen as those who (a) enjoy more ‘liberty’ when speaking 
and (b) must also ‘tolerate’ more criticism. It seems arguable that in certain situations, 
such as during election campaigns, at least the ‘tolerance’ level required of them will 
increase even further, particularly in their dealings with other politicians.24 They are 
indeed a special class when it comes to freedom of speech.  Journalists are, too, in that 
they enjoy the same ‘liberty’ as elected representatives, or at least a higher level than 
ordinary people, especially when criticizing political figures or the entire government.  
The remaining group of people –  everyone –  are nevertheless still free to voice their 
opinion, and may enjoy considerably more ‘liberty’ when making political statements 
than when insulting their next-door neighbours, but restrictions will more readily be 
accepted than when a member of a special class speaks. 
What is the rationale of that differentiation in treatment or, in other words, the 
different levels of protection of those affected by another’s speech through restrictive 
national legislation permitted by Article 10 of the Convention? Of course, the 
particular importance of the press in a free and democratic society has continually 
been emphasized by the Court.  But does that explain the differentiations made with 
respect to those being criticized? Could ‘vulnerability’25 be a factor, or the lack of 
means to defend oneself as an object of public debate? 
The politicians-cases seem to point in that direction. Politicians not only lay 
themselves open to close public scrutiny,26 they also have every possibility to publicly 
react even to harsh criticism, tools not available to everyone. The defencelessness-
argument has also been developed in cases concerning the judiciary, which is 
explicitly mentioned as an entity that can legitimately be protected against speech in 
paragraph 2 of Article 10. Whether judges should enjoy greater protection against 
criticism due to their essential function in a functioning democracy or be open to as 
much scrutiny by the general public and, in particular, the press as the other branches 
                                                 
24 See Eur. Ct. H.R., Appl. 42409/98, Wolfgang Schüssel v. Austria, decision on the admissibility of 21 
February 2002, para. 2 (accepting that “in the context of political battle in general and against the 
background of an electoral campaign in particular”  members of a political party and a trade union may 
distribute stickers showing a politician’s face half overlapped by the picture of another politician to 
indicate that they believe that their views on certain subjects are similar). 
25 See Alexander H.E. Morawa, “ ‘Vulnerability‘ as a Concept of International Human Rights Law” , 10 
Journal of International Relations and Development  (No. 1, 2003) (forthcoming) 
26 Cf. Eur. Ct. H.R., Lingens v. Austria, para. 42, and Oberschlick (No. 2) v. Austria, judgment of 1 July 
1997, Reports 1997-IV, at para. 29. 
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of government is open for debate.27  The Court, however, has said that the courts must 
“… be protected from destructive attacks that are unfounded, especially in view of the 
fact that judges are subject to a duty of discretion that precludes them from replying to 
criticism.” 28 
It all boils down to the ‘proportionality’ and ‘reasonableness’ standards the Court 
speaks of in Willis, and to the extent of the ‘margin of appreciation’ a state may claim.  
Not every distinction is prohibited, not absolute equality is required, but relative 
equality, or proportionality. What is proportionate depends, as always, on the 
particular circumstances of the case. Thus, the very same journalist may in one case 
be the victim of an unjustified interference with his freedom of speech29 while in 
another case he may have overstepped his boundaries.30  There are no general rules on 
‘proportionality’, merely compendiums of practice. 
The Court, like all human rights tribunals, not only scrutinizes state action in light 
of these standards, it employs them in its own jurisprudence.  In other words, the 
Court creates special classes of individuals and redefines the general standards of 
protection for them.  ‘Journalists’, ‘politicians’, and ‘the judiciary’ are examples of 
such classes in the area of free speech. But they are not unique: torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment, for instance, are prohibited in absolute terms irrespective of 
who the victim is; whether a certain treatment is severe enough to be qualified as 
inhuman, however, may depend in part on the mental and physical state of the person 
concerned.31 
                                                 
27 Cf. Raimo Pekkanen, “Criticism of the Judiciary by the Media” , in: Paul Mahoney et al. (eds.), 
Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective , Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal (Köln, 
Berlin, Bonn, Mü nchen, 2000), 1079-85. 
28 Eur. Ct. H.R., De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment of 24 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, at 
para. 37. 
29 Eur. Ct. H.R., Oberschlick v. Austria, judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A, No. 204, at paras. 61 et 
seq. (holding that the journalist’s conviction for having reproduced in a journal the text of a criminal 
complaint which he and other persons had laid against a politician breached Article 10 of the 
Convention.  During an election campaign, this politician had made certain public statements on TV 
concerning foreigners’ family allowances, and proposed that such persons should receive less 
favourable treatment than Austrians. The applicant had expressed the opinion that this proposal 
corresponded to the philosophy and the aims of National Socialism). See also Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria, at paras. 31 et seq. (holding that the use of the word “Trottel”  (idiot) when commenting on a 
politician’s provocative speech about the role of the German army in World War II was justified).  
30 Eur. Ct. H.R., Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A, No. 313, 
paras. 32 et seq. (holding that allegations of improper behaviour of judges of a particular court were 
neither shown to be true nor a fair comment). 
31 Cf. Eur. Ct. H.R., Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, No. 161, para. 
109 (holding that “…  the applicant’s youth at the time of the offence and his then mental state, on the 
psychiatric evidence as it stands, are …  to be taken into consideration as contributory factors tending, 
in his case, to bring the treatment on death row within the terms of Article 3 … ” ). 
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From both the case law and the court’s own classes-approach one may conclude 
that ‘proportionality’ is significantly influenced by ‘vulnerability’ or defencelessness.  
Unequal treatment appears to be justified in particular when one party –  non-
technically speaking –  to the case is placed at a disadvantage compared to either the 
other parties or a class. Ordinary people cannot convene press-conferences when 
criticized in public, politicians can, and must accordingly tolerate more. 
 
¨  ¨  ¨ 
 
Let us now turn to the positive aspects of non-discrimination or as we initially called 
it: ‘equal protection of the law’. The 12th Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention adopted in 2000 elevates the ‘European’ right to non-discrimination 
firstly to an independent –  no longer accessory –  right and, secondly, to an at least 
somewhat positive obligation of states by stipulating that “the enjoyment of any right 
set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 32  Thus, although 
it is “not intended to impose a general positive obligation on the Parties to take 
measures to prevent or remedy all instances of discrimination in relations between 
private persons,” 33 it may nevertheless under certain circumstances engage the 
responsibility of a state if it fails to provide adequate protection against discrimination 
stemming from non-state actors.34 
What protection is adequate depends in many ways on a factor that was introduced 
earlier when discussing negative obligations: ‘vulnerability’.  Active implementation 
of equality, and in particular affirmative measures to foster material equality, are 
intertwined with the need for support because the people concerned have no or 
                                                 
32 Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. 
33 Explanatory Report, para. 25. 
34 Cf. ibid., para. 26.  Mark Bell, “Combating Racism Through European Laws: A Comparison of the 
Racial Equality Directive and Protocol 12” , in: Isabelle Chopin and Jan Niessen (eds.), Combating 
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination: Taking the European Legislative Agenda Further  (Brussels/London, 
2002), 7– 34, 23— 24, while agreeing that in particular a clear lacuna in domestic laws arbitrarily 
depriving someone of protection, the failure of state organs to intervene in case of grave discrimination 
originating from private sources or a private actor taking over state responsibilities (such as privately-
run prison facilities) could trigger a state’s responsibility under Protocol No. 12, concludes that the 
protection afforded to individuals under EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, 
Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment Between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic 
Origin, Official Journal L 180 (19 July 2000), 22, is more effective.  
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insufficient tools available to remedy a situation themselves –  remember the limited 
possibility everyone but a politician has to defend himself against public criticism.  
The case of X and Y v. the Netherlands35 which the drafters of Protocol No. 12 make 
reference to in this respect is another example:  a mentally handicapped sixteen-year-
old girl was sexually assaulted in a privately-run home for handicapped children, but 
neither she nor her father could press criminal charges against the perpetrator because 
a lacuna in domestic law prevented both the victim (who was not capable of signing a 
complaint herself) and her father (whose signature could not validly replace that of the 
victim) from formally initiating the proceedings.  They could have sued the attacker in 
civil court.  Before the European Court of Human Rights they complained about the 
absence of protection of the girl’s right to privacy.  To resolve the case the Court had 
to assess whether criminal charges were the only appropriate tool to remedy 
infringements upon one’s personal integrity.  It found that recourse to criminal law 
was “not necessarily the only answer,” 36 but in the case of sexual assault it was, and 
indeed that was what Dutch law provided for in general.  While the vulnerable group 
–  victims of sexual assault –  could file criminal charges, the gap in the law prevented 
members of the most vulnerable group, handicapped minors, from resorting to that 
remedy. 
The question remained whether the general provision providing for criminal 
sanctions against perpetrators should be considered as sufficient for the most 
vulnerable group. “The applicants contended that the difference of treatment 
established by the legislature between the various categories of persons deserving of 
special protection against sexual assaults amounted to discrimination … ” .37  The 
Court did not “deem it necessary” 38 to answer that question, and might not have been 
able to resolve it merely on the basis of Article 14. 
But affirmative action to protect the rights of the particularly vulnerable is not alien 
to other, in particular specialized international conventions. The International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, for instance, 
provides: 
 
                                                 
35 Eur. Ct. H.R., judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A, no. 91.  
36 Ibid., para. 24. 
37 Ibid., para. 31. 
38 Ibid., para. 32. 
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Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement 
of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may 
be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial 
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, 
lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that 
they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have 
been achieved.39 
 
To that end, states “…  shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, 
including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any 
persons, group or organization.” 40 Bossuyt defines affirmative action as “a coherent 
packet of measures …  aimed specifically at correcting the position of members of a 
target group in one or more aspects of their social life, in order to obtain effective 
equality.” 41 
We are facing the same terms again: appropriate, adequate, proportionality; 
‘special measures’ are furthermore reigned in by a regime involving specificity, 
temporariness, and coherence.42  Of course we cannot categorize what is appropriate 
and adequate in the field of positive measures to ensure non-discrimination, maybe 
even less than with respect to the negative aspects of the right to equality.  But we can 
assess specific scenarios, such as the situation in which handicapped minors who are 
at risk of being assaulted find themselves.  Not only is it a breach of their right to have 
their personal integrity safeguarded if a gap in the law prevents them from having a 
perpetrator prosecuted after the fact, a state is also required to take the measures 
needed to prevent such acts from occurring. 
Members of minorities, too, frequently find themselves confronted with problems 
that differ from those the majority population faces. “They are often in a vulnerable 
position and have, in the past, often been subjected to discrimination.” 43  That, in turn, 
may not only justify, but require states to “take transitional affirmative action.” 44 That 
                                                 
39 General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, Article 1 ( 4). 
40 Ibid., Article 2 (1) (d) (emphasis added).  
41 Prevention of Discrimination: The Concept and Practice of Affirmative Action, final report 
submitted by Mr Marc Bossuyt, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Sub-Commission Resolution 
1998/5, dated 17 June 2002, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/21, para. 6 (hereinafter ‘Bossuyt, Final Report’). 
42 See Anne F. Bayefsky, “The Principle of Equality or Non-Discrimination in International Law” , 11 
Hum.Rts.L.J. (1990), 1-34, 26-7. 
43 Asbjø rn Eide, Final Text of the Commentary to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, dated 2 April 
2001, 12, para. 55. 
44 Ibid. 
    
 
10
   
a conflict might arise between the proposed principle permitting newly independent 
states in the course of nation building to take action to “create a more egalitarian 
society and a common nationality to strengthen [their] sovereignty” 45 and the right of 
minorities to have their identity preserved, if need be by affirmative measures, shall 
only be noted here, but cannot be explored any further. 
What measures are adequate in this respect depends on a broad range of factors.  
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for instance, recently 
recommended that states “take special measures to promote the employment of Roma 
in the public administration and institutions, as well as in private companies” 46 to 
combat discrimination against Roma. How far can states go? When does action to end 
existing inequality become a new form of discrimination? Even action taken with the 
legitimate intent to remedy existing inequality adversely affecting one particular 
group may have an “unjustifiable disparate impact” 47 upon, or “disproportionately 
affect” 48 the rights of another distinguishable group. 
 
¨  ¨  ¨ 
 
In sum, we may speak of three legal responses to different treatment:  (a) where it is 
prohibited, (b) where it is permitted and, (c) where it is mandated. 
 
(a) Where situations are objectively equal, unequal treatment is prohibited, and so is 
equal treatment of situations that are different. For instance, men and women in 
Austria have “equal rights and duties [as] spouses, with regard to their income and 
mutual maintenance.” 49  They both are eligible for (widow’s or widower’s) pensions 
after the death of their spouses. If widowers receive their pension payments only if 
they have no other source of income, while widows receive them irrespective of that, 
they are being discriminated against.50 By the same token, both nationals and 
foreigners lawfully working in Austria contribute equally to the public social security 
                                                 
45 Bossuyt, Final Report, para. 29. 
46 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), General Recommendation 27: 
Discrimination against Roma, dated 16 August 12000, at para. 28. 
47 CERD, General Recommendation 14: Definition of Discrimination, dated 19 March 1993, at para. 2.  
48 Eide, Commentary …  , E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, 12, para. 55.  
49 HRC, Communication No. 415/1990, Dietmar Pauger v. Austria, views of 26 March 1992, 
CCPR/C/44/D/415/1990, para. 7.4. 
50 Ibid., affirmed in Communication No. 716/1996, Dietmar Pauger (No. 2) v. Austria, views of 25 
March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996, para. 10.2.  
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schemes.  If under such circumstances certain benefits are reserved for nationals, that 
amounts to discrimination.51  In both cases, no reasonable and objective criteria exist 
that would justify a differentiation in treatment. 
 
(b) In many instances different treatment will be permitted. But even permissible 
differentiation faces its boundaries. It is, for instance, permissible to prescribe  
“differences between military and national alternative service and that such 
differences may, in a particular case, justify a longer period of service.” 52 But 
doubling the duration of the alternative service from 12 to 24 months solely to “test 
the sincerity of an individual’s convictions” 53 is not based on objective and reasonable 
criteria. 
 
(c) Finally, international law may mandate different treatment.  That is the tricky part.  
The contributions in this special focus section will explore these issues further, 
especially those related to positive discrimination, affirmative action, and the 
protection of members of minority groups. 
 
                                                 
51 See Eur. Ct. H.R., Gaygusuz v. Austria, judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV. 
52 HRC, Communication No. 689/1996, Richard Maille v. France, views of 10 July 2000, 
CCPR/C/69/D/689/1996, para. 10.4, and others.  
53 Ibid. 
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